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INTERNET ENTREPRENEURSHIP: NETWORKS AND 
PERFORMANCE OF INTERNET VENTURES IN CHINA 
 
Abstract:  This article examines the contingent value of entrepreneurs' networks to survival 
likelihood of Internet ventures, and the dynamics of entrepreneurs' networks over time. The 
empirical data are composed of the longitudinal surveys of 94 Internet ventures in Beijing, 
China. The study found the positive and the negative contingent effects of structural holes on the 
survival likelihood of new firms. The study found that networking skills of entrepreneurs are 
associated positively with the changes in networks over time. Improved social skills lead to 
greater firm legitimacy. 
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As China’s economy is growing rapidly, the domestic private sector is emerging from the 
shadows and playing a prominent role in the country’s economic development. Owing to the 
historical, institutional and cultural factors, the private sector in China exhibits a high degree of 
informality. Many enterprises possess vague property rights, ownership structure, corporate 
governance mechanisms, and financial records. This gives private entrepreneurs great flexibility 
to respond to an uncertain world composed of rapidly changing market conditions and unstable 
government regulations. This environment however also constitutes a great challenge to 
entrepreneurs to put their businesses on a firmer footing. Entrepreneurs find that an effective way 
of managing hostile environments in transition economies is doing business through personal 
networks of relationships because network ties provide resources and information, and help to 
find clients, suppliers, and investors, who are socially bound (Peng 2001). In this article, I 
examine the way in which Internet entrepreneurs in China (re) combine their personal networks 
and human capital to create viable e-businesses (Amit & Zott 2001). Specifically, I examine the 
interaction effects of entrepreneurs’ social networks and human capital on the survival likelihood 
of Internet ventures and explore the changes in entrepreneurs’ networks over time. 
There are two mainstream arguments about what types of social networks in terms of 
structure are beneficial to individuals, groups and organizations. On the one hand, coherent and 
dense networks enable actors to achieve their goals effectively because of cooperative behavior 
of members, high trust embedded in relationships and informal social mechanisms that control 
opportunistic behaviors (Coleman 1988). On the other hand, sparse and non-redundant networks 
facilitate actors’ access to new information, opportunities and resources promoting success of 
instrumental actions (Burt 1992). 
The instrumental value of networks however is contingent upon institutional and social 
context, and behaviors of individuals and organizations (Galaskiewicz & Zaheer 1999). For 
example, Burt (1997) argued that structural holes, i.e., disconnections between nonredundant 
contacts in a network, are especially valuable to managers with few peers. Podolny & Baron 
(1997) reported that structural holes in individual networks had significant positive and negative 
effects on career advancement depending on the network content.  At organizational level, Gulati 
& Higgins (2003) established that new firms’ ties to prominent venture capital firms are 
particularly beneficial to IPO success during cold markets, while ties to prominent investment 
banks are particularly beneficial to IPO success during hot markets. Likewise, Batjargal & Liu   4
(2004) found that effects of dyadic and triadic ties of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists on 
investment decisions made by venture capitalists were dependent on the human capital of 
entrepreneurs and technical qualities of venture projects. There is however a considerable gap in 
the literature on under what conditions structural properties of entrepreneurs’ networks affect 
venture performance. A purpose of this study is to examine the contingent value of structural 
holes in an entrepreneur’s network, i.e., when, where and how much structural holes are 
valuable, to the survival likelihood of startups by focusing on the interaction between structural 
holes and founders’ industry, startup and international experience. 
Networks contain inherent tensions between status quo and changes in terms of structure, 
composition and resources (Burt 2000, Gulati et al. 2001). Yet little is known about how 
personal networks evolve over time and how dynamics of networks influence results of 
purposive actions of actors. In this study, I examine how entrepreneurs’ network structure 
evolves over time, and the way in which changes in social skills of entrepreneurs influence 
performance of young firms. 
The country and industry context is the Internet industry in China. The Chinese Internet 
industry is an emergent sector, and therefore, there are a few commonly accepted rules, norms 
and "taken for granteds" to govern relationships (Nee 1992). This results in greater institutional 
and social uncertainties where personal relationships are important resources to get things done 
(Xin & Pearce 1996). The contingent value of networks therefore might be more pervasive in 
this industry and country context than in relatively mature industries and market economies 
(Galaskiewicz & Zaheer 1999). Furthermore, study of Internet entrepreneurship in general and 
Internet ventures in emerging markets in particular is a new research field (Amit & Zott 2001). I 
think that this study is one of the first studies of the Chinese information and Internet industry 
that generated US$99.2 billion in revenues in 2001 (Business Weekly 2002). Finally, the Chinese 
cultural and social milieu, which is regarded as relationship intense (Boisot & Child 1996), 
makes social networks dynamic and important for performance. These reasons justify the choice 
of the industry and country contexts of this study. 
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, I examine the Chinese version of 
networks - guanxi, and the Internet industry in China. In the following section, I propose 
hypotheses on venture survival and network dynamics. The methods section describes the 
sample and data collection, the variables and measurements, and the construct validation   5
procedures. In the results and discussion sections, I report the findings and interpret them in light 
of network theory. In the conclusion, I discuss the implications, the contributions and the 
limitations of this study. 
CONTEXT 
Social Networks in China: Guanxi 
The Chinese version of social networks is guanxi (connections) (King 1991). Guanxi is 
defined as a special relationship due to the existence of particularistic ties (Tsui et al. 2000). A 
set of networking strategies and tactics in China is called guanxixue - art of networking (Yang 
1994). Guanxixue is composed of numerous relationship building techniques and maintenance 
rituals (Gold et al. 2002). La guanxi (pull relationship) is a credo that describes a set of contact 
identification, approach and recruitment techniques. Empirical research on guanxi has produced 
both positive and negative effects of guanxi on outcome variables. Guanxi capital (Bian 2001) 
promotes interpersonal trust (Farh et al. 1998) and enhances firm performance (Park & Luo 
2001; Peng & Luo 2000). However, guanxi relationships have negative effects on dependent 
variables under certain circumstances (Chen et al. 2004; Tsui et al. 2002). The contingent effects 
of guanxi, and dynamics of guanxi remain largely unexplored in guanxi research. 
The Internet Industry in China 
The year 1994 is regarded as the start of the Internet connection in China (CNNIC 
2002a). The Internet industries cover Internet content providers, portals, Internet service 
providers, manufacturers of networking and telecommunication equipment, e-commerce firms, 
online business of non-Internet firms, software firms, and other related activities such as IT 
consulting and e-education. There were 80 million Internet users in China at the end of 2003. 
The number of Internet protocol address in China reached 23 thousand. Domain names registered 
under .CN totaled 126 thousand, while web sites reached 293 thousand. According to 
WebSideStory Inc, China accounted for 6.63 percent of global Internet traffic during July 2002 
becoming world's second largest web market after the United States. 
  In 2001, the information industry growth rate reached 20 percent. The Nasdaq listed 
portals, i.e., Sina.com, Sohu.com, and Netease.com, that dominate the Internet content market, 
are profitable due to the burgeoning market of SMS (short message services). China's e-
commerce volume in 2000 totaled $9.33 billion, 99 percent of which was B2B transactions. 
There were 677 domestic B2C virtual stores and 370 B2B commercial websites (Chinaonline   6
2001). In terms of region, Beijing leads the country. Some thirty-one percent of dot cn domain 
names and 21 percent of websites were registered in Beijing (CNNIC 2002b). Although the 
Internet industry in China is developing rapidly, there are numerous legal, regulatory and 
investment problems. The Chinese government blocks as much as 10 percent of the Internet, 
covering sites dealing with Taiwan, Tibet and dissidents along with news media, pornography 
and religious sites (CNN.com 2002). The bulk of financial investments into Internet industry is 
concentrated in large cities, furthering the "digital divide" between Chinese provinces. 
HYPOTHESES 
Firm Survival 
The social network theory postulates that networks’ structural holes present 
opportunities, which may be transformed into profit by financial and human capital of actors 
(Burt 1992). Outcomes of purposive actions of actors are dependent on the combinations of 
various types of capital players bring into market (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988). Structural 
hole is, Burt (1992: 18) defined, “a relationship of nonredundancy between two contacts. The 
hole is a buffer, like an insulator in an electric circuit. As a result of the hole between them, the 
two contacts provide network benefits that are in some degree additive rather than overlapping”. 
A structural hole is a disconnection or extremely weak relationship between two contacts. 
Structural holes are universal phenomena observable in any human networks including 
American, Chinese and French managerial networks (Burt et al. 2000; Tsui et al. 2002). Those 
entrepreneurs whose personal networks are rich in structural holes are likely to do well because 
of benefits sparse networks generate. Structural holes may lead to greater entrepreneurial 
opportunities in the form of new sales and supplier contracts, access to advertising channels, 
financial capital and important decisions, and participation in alliances and joint projects. A 
crucial benefit entrepreneurs obtain from sparse networks is timely access to nonredundant 
information and referral sources (Burt 1992). Entrepreneurs whose network position is central 
among disconnected clusters are likely to control information flows and in this way, they are 
likely to manufacture greater credit slips, which enhance their exchange power (Coleman 1988). 
Structural holes generate more diverse and creative ideas since people who live in the 
intersection of social worlds tend to have valuable ideas (Burt 2004). Structural holes promote 
greater structural autonomies that enable entrepreneurs to act upon new opportunities and 
neutralize harmful effects of costly concessions to strong ties.   7
  The way in which entrepreneurs exploit new opportunities spotted in structural holes is 
dependent on the motivation, ability and experience of entrepreneurs (Burt 1992). In this way, 
human capital, i.e., education and skills (Becker 1975), transforms opportunities into tangible 
benefits. I propose that entrepreneurial (startup) experience will enhance benefits of 
nonredundant networks for Chinese entrepreneurs. Sparse networks are effective when 
entrepreneurs have tacit knowledge of the process of venture creation and first-hand experience 
of product development because experienced entrepreneurs are able to entangle venture-specific 
opportunities and information from the sea of information and opportunity flows in networks 
(Bruderl et al. 1992). Habitual entrepreneurs have sharpened alertness to brokerage tensions and 
profit from tertius gaudens - "the third who benefits" effectively (Burt 1992). Confidence gained 
from previous startups motivates founders to seek out decisively or even create deliberately 
inefficiencies in networks and manipulate skillfully between sides. Field interviews support this 
logic. Michael Chui, the CEO of "Beijing Hi-world software technology", said in an interview: 
When we started the construction company, we realized that we need people who know well not 
only construction electronics (lighting or elevators) but also IT and network systems including 
software to manage large building's electronics, security system and service infrastructure. 
Among senior managers, my profession was closest to match the need and I started to work on 
this. Eventually, I realized that there is no software company in China that writes software for 
tall buildings (office, hotels and convention centers). Construction firms do not engage in 
software development, and software programmers overlook this niche of the market. I started 
this venture to fill this gap. To date, I am very satisfied with how things are going” (Author's 
interview, July 2002, Beijing). 
 
Hypothesis 1: The number of structural holes in the entrepreneur's network is associated 
positively with firm survival when the entrepreneur has startup experience. 
 
The next hypothesis is on why and how Internet industry experience strengthens impacts 
of structural holes on firm performance. Experienced entrepreneurs whose networks are rich in 
structural holes are likely to detect signals of technology progress earlier. Industry specific 
knowledge would enable entrepreneurs to identify correctly their firms' positions in the 
competitive network of the industry and position their firms in such a way that their strengths 
match opportunities and negative implications of threats and weaknesses are neutralized. Since 
Internet industry is a new industry, there are many gaps and vacuums in the value chain (Amit & 
Zott 2001). Founders who are positioned in between disconnected network cliques would be the 
ones who get information first and perceive lucrative opportunities in time (Burt 1992). Working   8
in the Internet industry enables entrepreneurs to follow how demands for products and services 
evolve, and customize their products accordingly to increase revenue. The regulatory framework 
of the industry is in flux in China and therefore, well-connected CEOs will be able to respond 
competitively to new policies and rules. This reasoning is consistent with an expert’s 
observation. Professor Wang of Peking University concludes that combination of industry 
knowledge and guanxi networks helped high tech entrepreneurs to succeed:  
Most entrepreneurs in the Zhongguancun district have been working before in R&D institutes of 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences and universities. They possess excellent technological 
knowledge and use them in creative ways. Furthermore, everybody seems to be connected to 
everyone else in the district because often they are graduates of Peking University and Tsinghua 
University. This guanxi "infrastructure" seems to facilitate their success (Author's Interview, 
September 2002, Beijing).  
 
Hypothesis 2: The number of structural holes in the entrepreneur's network is associated 
positively with firm survival when the entrepreneur has Internet industry experience. 
  
A unique sub-population of the new entrepreneurial class in China is entrepreneurs who 
returned to China after obtaining education and work experience in Western developed countries. 
For example, 9000 returned specialists founded their businesses or teamed up with others to 
create high tech ventures in the Zhongguancun Science Park in Beijing within first three years of 
operation of the park (Liu 2002). I hypothesize that Chinese entrepreneurs who studied and 
worked in the West (North America and Western Europe) are likely to benefit more from 
nonredundant networks. Western-trained entrepreneurs possess superior technology, 
management and market know-how, personal networks in the West, and language skills and 
cultural awareness (Wattanavitukul 2002). They are knowledgeable of diverse sources of 
information and effective ways of how and when to collect reliable information. Language skills 
enable returnees to keep track of the latest Internet technology and industry trends in the West, 
and capitalize on brokerage opportunities since China is following the West in the information 
industry. Returned Internet entrepreneurs would benefit from being late-movers because they 
learn what e-business models are effective in the West, and what mistakes they must avoid. 
Transnational entrepreneurs whose networks contain many disconnected ties in different 
countries, for example, United States and China, are likely to profit more from brokerage roles 
and opportunities of joint ventures, alliances, mergers and acquisitions, and venture capital 
investments. Returnees are placed in the intersections of learning and professional networks in 
the West, current business networks in China, and ties with schoolmates and colleagues prior   9
Western experience in China. This may expose them to diverse ideas and opportunities that 
might be exploited. Furthermore, education and socialization in more individualistic cultures of 
the West may make these executives less hesitant to profit from brokerages in networks. 
Interviews with returned specialists support these assumptions. Henry Lee, the CEO of 
Readchina.com - an Internet content provider (ICP), explained: 
China is a nation that has unique cultural traditions. I appreciated this during my study and work 
in Canada for a decade. When you live in the West, you learn to look at things in China from 
different perspectives. You recognize strengths and weaknesses of everything Chinese - 
government, economy, education and culture. You learn to combine the best of the two systems. 
I believe this is an extremely important advantage (Author's Interview, June 2001, Beijing).  
 
Hypothesis 3: The number of structural holes in the entrepreneur's network is associated 
positively with firm survival when the entrepreneur has Western experience. 
 
 
 
 
Network Dynamics 
Despite its theoretical and practical importance, little is known about how networks of 
individuals change over time. Network methodologists theorized that dynamics of network 
structure are a function of individual needs and choices because actors choose to form or delete 
relationships (e.g., friendship ties) and rational behavior of players who structure their networks 
to maximize their power (Willer & Willer 2000; Zeggelink 1994). For example, Burt (2000) 
found that relationship decay defined as the tendency for relationships to weaken and disappear 
is a function of tie age (the older the relationship the lower the decay rate) and node age (the 
older the node, i.e., banker, the lower the decay rate). I propose that the way in which guanxi 
networks of entrepreneurs evolve over time is a function of networking skills of entrepreneurs. 
Networking skills are a set of strategies, tactics and rituals of contact recruitment, relationship 
maintenance and resource mobilization. A skillful network builder is a motivated actor 
(Kadushin 2002) who is knowledgeable of existing methods and routines of network expansion 
and restructuring (Yang 1994). An effective network builder clarifies first what kind of member 
in terms of power, wealth, network position, reputation, expertise and personality is required to 
satisfy her business needs. This is followed by systematic search for an appropriate contact. Once 
the target person is found, a set of approach techniques such as using a trusted intermediary, cold   10
calls, or cruising around the "right" places, will be deployed. The President of "Chuangshi 
Tengfei", an Internet service provider (ISP), concluded:  
Although the Chinese are ambiguous towards guanxi practice, guanxixue  is a part of the 
traditional Chinese culture. Some people say "no guanxi no job", or "no guanxi no success"…  It 
is extremely difficult to refuse to your friends' or colleagues' requests since all involved lose their 
face. The Chinese are, in my view, immersed to establish relationships with useful people” 
(Author's interview, June 2001, Beijing). 
 
Entrepreneurs who are skilled in guanxixue are likely to build networks rich in structural 
holes because they are keenly aware of brokerage opportunities they present. A significant part 
of networking activities therefore is devoted to recruitment of ties from different sectors (e.g., 
officialdom versus private sector) and disconnected clusters. 
Hypothesis 4: Networking skills of the entrepreneur are associated positively with the increase 
of structural holes in the network over time. 
    
Firm Legitimacy 
The more the entrepreneurs practice guanxi the more they learn the culture and nuances 
of networking. Improvements in networking skills lead to greater ability to locate desirable 
partners, choose effective recruitment techniques, and reduce direct and indirect costs of tie 
establishment, cultivation and maintenance. In this way, improved social and communication 
skills are likely to generate greater "social returns". Entrepreneurs learn new networking 
techniques, e.g., intense online communications, and come up with creative combinations of 
existing methods with new twists to improve their social status. Progress in social skills will be 
reflected in improved abilities to categorize ties accurately, and get rid off costly contacts 
gradually. Entrepreneurs analyze network structures and composition, and design and implement 
suitable strategies for network restructuring and membership turnover. In addition, entrepreneurs 
are likely to strike a balance between strong and weak ties since both provide different benefits. 
  It is assumed that improved social skills of entrepreneurs would be associated with 
increased firm legitimacy defined as a generalized perception that the actions of firms and 
entrepreneurs are desirable, proper and appropriate (Suchman 1995). Superior social skills of 
executives help their firms to gain central network positions that are prestigious and approved, 
and enable them to neutralize negative perceptions of brokers who take advantage of others. 
Negotiating the external environment of the firm smoothly creates positive impressions of the 
firm's activities. This is reflected in the increased numbers of outside investors besides venture   11
capitalists. In addition to delivering resources and technology, institutional investors enhance 
legitimacy and status of new firms (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1996, Stuart et al, 1999). 
Hypothesis 5: Improvement in networking skills of the entrepreneur is positively associated 
with increase in the number of investors. 
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
The data is composed of structured telephone interviews with 94 Internet entrepreneurs in 
July-August 2001, and follow-up interviews with 52 original respondents in August-September 
2002. All interviews were conducted in Beijing. In 2001, my research assistants and I created a 
list of 410 Internet related firms (Internet service providers, Internet content providers, e-
commerce, network technology, software) based in Beijing. In all, we contacted 120 CEOs 
selecting every-third on the list of 382 firms whose contact details were identified, and 98 agreed 
to be interviewed. The positive response rate is 81 percent. After one-year interval (Burt 2000), 
we re-interviewed 52 respondents. Some thirteen respondents declined our request, and 29 firms 
were unreachable suggesting that these firms are no longer functional. We verified non-existence 
of these firms by employing three procedures. First, we tried to contact them through phone, fax, 
and email. Second, we checked their websites and found that most do not exist or inactive. 
Finally, we looked at China yellow pages 2002 and did not find these firms except three. For 
validity reasons, I compared the sample of 52 re-interviewed entrepreneurs with 13 refused 
respondents, and ANOVA results on firm age, firm size, and number of structural holes in 2001 
did not suggest any significant differences between two samples. The questionnaires were 
designed in English. The English version was translated into Chinese by a Chinese professor. 
Another Chinese professor back translated the Chinese version. Teams of three research 
assistants based at Peking University conducted phone interviews in 2001 and 2002. Each 
interview lasted approximately in 40 minutes.  
Measures 
Independents. Structural holes 2001 is measured as the number of structural holes in the 
network of each respondent in 2001. The questions that capture structural holes are presented in 
the Appendix. Five questions on professional contacts, informal contacts, discussion contacts and 
spouse were asked to generate names. Finally, respondents were asked to describe the connection 
between each pair of contacts as especially close, distant, or something intermediate. The number   12
of distant relationships in a network is the number of structural holes. Structural holes 2002 is 
the difference between the number of structural holes in 2001 and 2002. Internet experience is 
measured as years of working in the Internet industry (Schoonhoven et al. 1990). Startup 
experience is a binary variable of one if the entrepreneur is experienced, and zero otherwise 
(Bruderl et al. 1992; Schoonhoven et al. 1990; Shane & Stuart 2002). Western experience is 
measured in years of working and study in Western developed countries (North America and 
Western Europe). Networking skills 2001 is measured by a scale that is comprised of three 
questions: "I am good at the art of networking”; "My friends think of me as someone who is 
good at the art of networking"; "I always make efforts to expand and enrich my networks”. 
Distribution values of each question were five-point Likert scale items ranging from strongly 
agree (5) to strongly disagree (1). I computed the scale by adding up the values in each item and 
dividing them by three. Networking skills 2002 is the difference between the scales in 
networking skills in 2001 and 2002. 
Dependents. Firm survival is a binary variable of one if the firm survived, and zero 
otherwise. The otherwise category includes all unreachable firms in 2002. Thirteen respondents 
who refused to be re-interviewed were excluded from the analysis. Investors 2002 measure firm 
legitimacy (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1996). The question "how many firms (excluding 
venture capital firms) invested in your firm" captures the number of investors. Investors 2002 is 
the difference between the number of investors in 2001 and 2002.  
Controls. Firm age is measured as years from the date of registration. The number of 
full-time employees in 2001 measures firm size. Venture capital indicates the sum of private 
equity raised before 2001 survey in thousand $. Government officials are regarded as important 
contacts in China (Peng & Luo 2000) and therefore, I included officials 2001 that measures the 
percentage of government officials in a network. Young firm alliances are important predictors 
of their performance (Baum et al. 2000; Stuart et al. 1999). Therefore, I included a control 
variable project partners 2001 that captures the number of state owned R&D institutions with 
whom the firm has joint product development projects. Project partners 2002 is the difference 
between the number of partner institutions in 2001 and 2002. Finally, I control for various sub-
sectors within the Internet industry because previous research showed that external factors and 
market stage influence new venture survival and growth (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1990). 
Firms were classified as Internet service and content provider, e-commerce firms, software firms   13
and other Internet related (networking equipment, distributors and others) as the main business 
by revenue. 
Construct validity. Measurements for structural holes are externally valid since the 
method of name generation has been proved as valid (Burt 1992; 2004; Burt et al. 2000). I 
counted the number of contacts who were named again in 2002 and found that 82 percent of 
contacts from 2001 were named again in 2002 on average. This indicates an acceptable 
compositional reliability (Marsden 1993) and is consistent with findings of previous research 
(Podolny & Baron 1997). Thus, network measurements are internally and externally valid. 
The reliability coefficient (Cronbach alpha) for networking skills 2001 is 0.81. I 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of the measurement model associated with Likert scale 
items to assess how well the interview questions load onto the constructs. I found that the 
comparative fit index is 0.84, the incremental fit index is 0.92, and the root mean squared error 
of approximation is 0.075. The findings suggest that the measurement is valid and reliable. Since 
the questions on networking skills 2001 are perceptual items, I did validate these data by calling 
up 20 randomly chosen friends of respondents. In all, 61 respondents provided phone numbers of 
their friends in 2001. We contacted 20 friends selecting every third on the list. We asked the 
question "How do you assess networking skills of your friend (the entrepreneur)", and found that 
answers of 18 (90%) friends were consistent with answers of respondents. Therefore, this 
measurement is externally valid.  
Some twelve entrepreneurs provided phone numbers of outside investors in 2001, and we 
confirmed investors' equity ownership by calling up every second investor (6) on the list. The 
findings were confirmatory. Some seven institutes who have joint R&D and design projects were 
contacted by phone and asked to confirm the entrepreneurs' claim in 2001. All organizations 
except one institute gave positive answers. Thus, these measurements are valid externally. 
In order to collect additional financial performance data, we approached the Taxation 
Department of the Haidian district government in north Beijing where most of the surveyed firms 
were registered. We created a list of 15 randomly chosen firms from 52 re-interviewed, and 
asked the taxation department to provide financial information on these firms. A senior officer 
from the department declined our request, but confirmed that all 15 firms were functioning and 
paying taxes by the end of September 2002. Although we do not have hard accounting 
information, this confirmation indicates the validity and reliability of firm performance. A   14
research assistant, who was not a member of the interview teams, conducted data validation 
interviews and phone calls. This study is a cross-level study in terms of unit of analysis. 
Independent and some dependent variables are measured at individual (CEO) level but some 
dependent variables and control variables are measured at organization level. Such research 
strategies are acceptable as long as measurements and constructs are valid internally and 
externally (Rousseau, 1985). 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 suggests that the firms in the sample become less diversified over 1 year period. 
Most firms except ISPs and equipment distributors decreased their scope. This is explained by 
the crisis in the Internet industry in 2000, which forced players to concentrate financial and 
human resources on their core businesses. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and Pearson's correlations. I present here the data 
on 52 re-interviewed entrepreneurs in 2002. The mean age of surveyed startups is 2.67 years. 
The number of full-time employees was 41 (S. D = 61.76) in 2001 indicating that most firms are 
small. The mean volume of venture capital raised is $192 thousand (S.D = 455). The mean 
number of structural holes in 2001 was 6.76, and officials of various ranks comprised 11 percent 
of network members in 2001. Changes in networking skills, structural holes, institutional 
investors, and project partners were positive in 2002. 
Insert Table 1 and 2 about here 
Firm Survival 
In Table 3, I present the results of logistic regression analysis predicting firm survival in 
2002. Model 1 is the base model that examines effects of all independent and control variables 
on venture survival likelihood. The model is significant (Chi-square 25.16). The model reveals 
that project partners 2001 (Baum et al. 2000; Lee et al. 2001, Stuart et al. 1999), startup 
experience (Bruderl et al. 1992; Gimeno et al. 1997) and Western experience have significant 
positive effects on firm survival. The model indicates that software firms were less likely to 
survive. 
 Insert Table 3 about here 
  Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 explore effects of interactions of structural holes with startup 
experience, Internet experience and Western experience on firm survival likelihood. Model 2   15
reports insignificant negative effects of interactions of structural holes and startup experience, 
and positive main effects of structural holes and startup experience on venture survival. Model 2 
is significant (Chi-square 17.1). The main positive effect of structural holes is consistent with 
findings of previous research (Burt 1992, 2000; Podolny & Baron 1997). Hypothesis  1 that 
predicted positive interaction effects of structural holes and startup experience on firm survival is 
not supported.  Model 3 illustrates that interactions of structural holes and Internet experience 
have no effects on firm survival. The model is significant (Chi-square 18.27). Hypothesis 2 that 
proposed positive interaction effects of structural holes and Internet industry experience on firm 
survival is not supported. Model 4 reveals that interaction effects of structural holes and Western 
experience on firm survival are significant and positive. The model is significant (Chi-square 
26.48). The impact of structural holes on firm survival is contingent upon Western experience of 
founders. Hypothesis 3 that predicted positive interaction effects of structural holes and Western 
experience on firm performance is supported. Model 5 illustrates effects of all variables on 
venture survival. The model is significant (Chi-square 39.79). The model reveals positive main 
effects of project partners 2001, startup experience and Western experience on firm performance. 
The model reveals positive interaction effects of structural holes and Western experience, and 
negative interaction effects of structural holes and startup experience on venture survival. 
Network Dynamics and Firm Legitimacy 
Table 4 demonstrates the results of linear regression analysis predicting changes in 
structural holes, and investors. Model 1 reveals that networking skills 2001 are associated 
positively with the increase of structural holes in founders’ networks over time. The model is 
significant (F=3.1). Hypothesis 4 that predicted positive relationships between networking skills 
and increase in structural holes is supported. Model 2 suggests that improvement in networking 
skills is associated positively with the net increase in the number of new investors in 2002. The 
model is not significant. Hypothesis 5 that proposed positive relationships between improvement 
in networking skills and net increase in the number of investors is supported. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
DISCUSSION 
The findings reveal mixed results for proposed hypotheses. Entrepreneurial experience 
and structural holes are two variables that do not “interact” with each other. Contrary to my 
prediction, combination of startup experience and structural holes is harmful for venture   16
performance. In contrast to novice entrepreneurs, habitual entrepreneurs have established 
reputations within the local entrepreneurial community, i.e., Zhongguancun district, and 
therefore, they deliberately avoid exploiting opportunities spotted in bridge relationships because 
brokers in general are perceived as manipulators in China. As entrepreneurs act to create new 
ventures, stories about their behaviors are told and retold (Lounsbury & Glynn 2001). Negative 
stories about entrepreneurs may harm their reputation, legitimacy and performance. Therefore, 
habitual entrepreneurs may be hesitant to act as intermediaries between unconnected ties. 
Correlations in Table 2 reveal that startup experience and Western experience are correlated 
negatively although the coefficient is insignificant. This may suggest that those entrepreneurs 
who have startup experience have less Western experience. Consequently, they have been 
engaged in local entrepreneurial activities longer. The inverse indicator of a sparse network is a 
dense network where alters are connected (Burt 1992; Podolny & Baron 1997). It is suggested 
that dense and cohesive networks, i.e., fewer structural holes, are effective when entrepreneurs 
have startup experience. Cohesive networks are conducive to firm survival because of high trust, 
cooperative norms and informal sanctions for deviant behaviors. The finding suggests that 
structural holes have negative contingent effects on firm survival. This is consistent with findings 
of Ahuja (2000) and Podolny & Baron (1997) who found negative main effects of structural 
holes on outcome variables in the Western context, and Tsui et al (2002) who found negative 
main effects of structural holes in the Chinese context. The evidence that dense networks may be 
more useful for serial entrepreneurs is in support of the closure type of social capital elaborated 
by Coleman (1988). 
Internet industry experience is not beneficial to exploitation of brokerage opportunities. 
Working in the Internet industry and creation of new e-businesses does not enhance 
entrepreneurs’ abilities to profit from arbitrage opportunities in disconnected network clusters. 
Western trained entrepreneurs do better due to their superior skills in turning 
opportunities spotted in structural holes into viable products and services. They are 
psychologically comfortable to profit from their network positions that link various cliques. 
Western experienced entrepreneurs sell greater volumes at higher prices and buy more at lower 
costs, because their customers and suppliers are disconnected players. 
The previous research found positive contingent effects of networks on outcome 
variables (Burt 1997; Galaskiewicz & Zaheer 1999). This study revealed both positive and   17
negative contingent effects of structural holes on firm survival, depending on the type of human 
capital, e.g., startup and Western experience.  
Internet ventures allied with government R&D institutes were more likely to survive. 
Alliances with R&D institutions facilitate access to information, financial resources, new product 
ideas, technologies, government contracts, subsidies, exclusive licenses and permissions, 
government sponsored promotions of product brand names through exhibitions, competitions 
and quality certificates, and government controlled advertising, marketing and distribution 
channels.  
The Chinese entrepreneurs learn techniques and rituals of guanxixue and systematically 
deploy them for effective network building (Yang 1994). Relationship building and maintenance 
is fruitful to the extent that they recruit and retain nonredundant contacts from resource-rich 
clusters. Those entrepreneurs who know well nuances of brokerage go after new contacts 
consciously and recruit them skillfully. Theoretically, the finding indicates that individual 
network evolution is a function of networking strategy of players other things being equal 
(Willer & Willer 2000; Zeggelink 1994). 
Improved networking skills help entrepreneurs to find prestigious institutional investors, 
e.g., large corporations and financial institutions, and approach them in the "right" way at the 
"right" time. Well-oiled guanxi techniques convince potential investors in trustworthiness, 
predictable post-investment behavior, and good intentions of the entrepreneurial team (Batjargal 
& Liu 2004). Improved abilities to deploy guanxi methods in creative ways help Chinese 
entrepreneurs to make guanxi deals effectively. New investors promote positive perceptions of 
Internet ventures, assist these firms to obtain higher status and neutralize liabilities of newness. 
Thus, improved social skills lead to greater institutional and cognitive legitimacy of new 
ventures. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study found that effects of structural holes on venture performance are contingent on 
the type of experience entrepreneurs have. Entrepreneurs who have different experience, i.e., 
startup versus Western, are effective players in different networks. Cohesive networks are 
especially beneficial to those who started businesses before and who are embedded more in local 
networks. On the contrary, sparse networks are especially beneficial to those entrepreneurs who   18
studied and worked in the West. “Local” and “Western” entrepreneurs capitalize on different 
benefits each type of networks offers. Local entrepreneurs benefit from high trust, cooperative 
behavior and informal norms in tight networks. Western entrepreneurs benefit from information, 
opportunity and control benefits in sparse networks that connect different countries, regions and 
clusters. This study indicates that the network closure advanced by Coleman (1988) and the 
network brokerage advocated by Burt (1992) are not mutually exclusive, and both can be 
effective depending on the context. 
  Future research should examine whether contingent effects of structural holes are 
universal across cultures or culture-specific. Another dimension of future research is to examine 
how effects of other network parameters, e.g., network content and relational trust, on 
performance are influenced by contextual and behavioral factors. The study implies that 
entrepreneurs should deploy various types of capital, e.g., social and human capital, in 
recombined manners for entrepreneurial success (Schumpeter 1961). A possible question that 
could be studied further is how inherent tensions of inertia and change in networks interact and 
evolve over time. It implies that competitive players are recommended to learn and re-learn 
networking techniques and routines to shape and restructure their networks constantly to 
generate greater opportunities. An interesting issue that could be explored is that how and why 
perceived improvements in networking skills influence other outcome variables, for example, 
financial and innovation performance of firms. Entrepreneurs are advised to be socially creative 
and alert to new networking methods that may broaden their opportunity horizons. 
This study contributes to social network theory in the sense that indirect effects of 
structural holes on outcome variables can be both positive and negative. Individuals can shape 
and restructure their networks if they are strategic in their networking behaviors. This article 
contributes to the literature on e-business and entrepreneurship by empirically proving that 
Internet entrepreneurs do create values by combining their social and human capital.  
Several limitations of the study should be discussed. Some measurements are context 
specific, e.g., Western experience. This may impose limits on generalizability of the findings to 
other social and cultural contexts. The industry context of the study is the Internet industry in 
China, which is less than 10 years old. The institutional, regulatory and market immaturity may 
have affected the results although I assume that all entrepreneurs are exposed to the similar 
country, industry and cultural contexts to the same extent. The sample size is small, and standard   19
deviations for some variables are rather high. Lastly, some of the findings are rather tentative, 
and therefore, one should be cautious of over generalization of the results. 
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Table 1. Firms by Business in 2001 and 2002 
 
     2001 
n=94 
(total) 
2001 
n=52 
(re-interviewed) 
2002 
n=52 
(re-interviewed) 
       
1 Internet  service 
provider 
14 7  7 
2 Internet  content 
provider 
36 18 14 
3 E-commerce 
 
29 15 10 
4 Networking 
technology 
16 8  5 
5 Software  development 
 
33 16  8 
6 Equipment  distributor 
 
5 3 6 
7  Other Internet related 
 
13 7  6 
   25
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson's Correlations (N=52) 
 
 Variables 
 
M  S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1  Structural holes 2001 
 
6.76  5.30        
2  Officials 2001 (%) 
 
0.11  0.16  .02       
3 Networking  skills  2001  3.02 0.61  -
.38*
* 
.01      
4 Networking  skills  2002  0.49 0.98 .24 -.13  -
.61*
* 
   
5  Structural holes 2002 
 
0.20 5.52  -
.91*
* 
-.03 .43*
* 
-.27    
6  Venture capital (in 
thousand US$) 
192.1 455 .33* -.08 -.16  .07 -.29*   
7 Investors  2002 
 
0.01 0.56 -.04 .03 -.15  .27* .06 -.04 
8  Project partners 2002 
 
0.35 0.77 .16 -.06 -.03 -.03 -.08 .19 
9  Western experience (years) 
 
0.88 2.02 .21  .09 -.03 -.12 -.12 -.12 
10 Startup  experience 
 
0.37 0.49 -.04 .25 .22 -.13 .01 .13 
11  Internet experience (years) 
 
1.94 3.54 -.21 .07 .18 -.08 .21 -.11 
12  Firm age (years) 
 
2.67 2.18 -.08 -.04 -.23 .16  .03 -.14 
13  Firm size (number of 
employees) 
41.69 61.76 .41*
* 
-.05 -.21 .23 -.36* .12 
14  Internet service and content 
providers 
.39  .49  .13 -.09 -.09 -.07 -.11 .06 
15 E-commerce  firms 
 
.19  .40 -.06 .25 .22 -.18 .03 -.13 
16 Software  firms 
 
.15 .36 .04 .01 .07 .07 .01 .01 
17  Other Internet related firms 
 
.25  .44  -.12 -.14 -.16 .18  .08  .04 
 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
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Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson's Correlations (Continued) 
 
 
 Variables 
 
7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
8  Project partners 2002 
 
.02     
9 Western  experience 
(years) 
 
-.11 .11   
10 Startup  experience 
 
.03 -.09 -.01   
11  Internet experience (years) 
 
-.13 -.01 -.03 .18   
12  Firm age (years)  .06 .01
1
.01 -
.29
*
-.05   
13  Firm size (number of 
employees) 
.03 .18 -.04 -.04 .05 .45
**
  
14  Internet service and 
content providers 
.10 -.03 .04 .04 -.13 .11 .01  
15 E-commerce  firms  .10 -.09 -.02 -.07 .06 -.10 -.12  -
.38
** 
16 Software  firms  -.06 .01 .07 .22 .29
*
-.12 .02 -
.34
* 
-.21
17  Other Internet related 
firms 
-.16 .08 -.1 -.17 -.14 .07 .09 -
.47
** 
-
.28
*
-.25
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Firm Survival in 2002 (N=81) 
 
 Model  1 
 
Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Controls       
Firm  age  -.05 -.08 -.09 -.14 -.21 
Firm  size  .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
Venture  capital  .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
Project partners 2001  1.1¶  1.35*  1.02¶  1.26*  2.07* 
Officials  2001  -1.43 -.67  -.73 -1.19  -3.37 
Internet service and content 
provider 
-.96 -.9 -.74  -1.36  -1.51 
E-commerce  -1.12 -.99 -1.14  -1.39  -1.25 
Software -2.01*  -1.26  -1.55¶  -2.21*  -2.89* 
       
Main effects       
Structural holes 2001 
 
.11  .15¶  .12 .06 .16 
Startup experience 
 
1.02¶  2.43*    3.32* 
Internet experience 
 
.26  .48  .64 
Western experience 
 
.57*    .68¶  .71¶ 
Interaction effects          
       
Startup experience X 
Structural holes 2001 
 
 -.26     -.42¶ 
Internet experience X 
Structural holes 2001 
 
   .03  -.06 
Western experience X 
Structural holes 2001 
 
    .27*  .41** 
-2LL 
 
79.61 87.78 86.49 78.28 64.98 
Chi-square 
 
25.16* 17.1¶ 18.27¶  26.48**  39.79*** 
 
Values represent B coefficients. 
 
¶p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001  28
Table 4. Linear Regression Analysis Predicting Network Dynamics, 
and Firm Legitimacy in 2002 (N=52) 
 
 Structural  holes 
2002 
Investors 2002 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Controls    
Firm age 
 
.27¶ .01 
Firm size 
 
-.41** -.02 
Venture capital 
 
-.15 -.05 
Project partners 
2002 
.01 .08 
Officials 2001 
 
-.03 .03 
Internet service and 
content providers 
-.21 .27 
E-commerce 
 
-.19 .28¶ 
Software 
 
-.08 .06 
Predictors 
 
  
Networking skills 
2001 
 
.41**  
Networking skills 
2002 
 
 .36* 
    
Model F 
 
3.1** .91 
Adjusted R square 
 
.26 .02 
 
Values represent standardized B coefficients. 
 
¶p< 0.1 
*p < 0.05  
**p < 0.01  
***p< 0.001   29
Appendix: Name Generator Questions 
 
I borrowed questions that capture structural holes from the short-form of the sociometric 
questionnaire developed at the University of Chicago’s Graduate School of Business to measure 
the social capital of managers and other professionals. The questionnaire is available from the 
web-site (http://gsb.chicago.edu/fac/ronald.burt). In total, 6 questions were asked to generate 
names: 1. Considering all of the professional contacts you have made in your career so far, who 
have been most valued contacts in the sense that they were the most important to your 
achievements? 2. Shifting to a broader view of your network, consider the people with whom 
you like to spend your free time. Over the last six months, who are the two or three people you 
have been with most often for informal social activities such as going out to lunch, dinner, 
drinks, films, visiting one another’s homes, and so on? 3. From time to time, most people discuss 
important matters with other people, people they trust. The range of important matters varies 
from person to person across work, leisure, family, politics, whatever. The range of relations 
varies across work, family, friends, and advisors. If you look back over the last six months, who 
are the three or four people with whom you discussed matters important to you? 4. What is first 
name and last initial of your spouse or person with whom you are living as if married. Spouse 
was excluded in the final analysis. 5. Please list (table was presented) – up to a maximum of 20 
names –each person named in the preceding questions. This question has generated a full list of 
names.  
 
Finally, respondents were asked to describe the connection between each pair of contacts 
as especially close, distant or something intermediate. This question captures structural holes in 
personal networks. The wording is as follows: The next task is to describe the strength of 
relations between listed people. You do this by circling codes in the matrix below (Matrix table 
was included in the questionnaire). This is a complex question, but it is essential to measuring 
social capital – and answering the question is a simple task when taken one column at a time. 
Begin with the first person listed. Relations with the first person are listed in the first column. 
Indicate his or her relationship with the person in each row in one of three ways: Circle EC if 
there is an ESPECIALLY CLOSE relation between the row person and the first person (like this: 
D. (EC); Circle D if there the row person and first person are DISTANT in the sense that they 
rarely work together, are total strangers as far as you know, or do not enjoy one another’s 
company (like this: (D). EC; Leave D..EC blank to indicate that two people neither distant nor 
especially close. 
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